[GDWT] Godwit -- Emergency identity recovery -- camera fingerprint, fuzzy vault, printable docs and crypto wallets #25

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opened 2026-03-31 17:11:51 -07:00 by pyr0ball · 0 comments

pyr0ball commented

2026-03-31 17:11:51 -07:00

Owner

Godwit

Emergency identity recovery for when you have nothing -- no ID, no phone, no password, no money. Uses camera-based fingerprint capture and fuzzy vault cryptography to unlock a pre-prepared recovery kit from any device with a camera.

Problem

If you are robbed, your car is towed, or any other emergency strips you of wallet and phone simultaneously, your only remaining authentication factor is your body. Passwords require memory. Devices require possession. Biometrics are always with you.

Technical approach

Multi-shot camera capture (library computer webcam, borrowed smartphone)
Illumination normalization + ridge enhancement + minutiae extraction
Fuzzy vault / fuzzy commitment scheme -- biometric derives the key, biometric is never stored
Raw biometric template discarded immediately after vault construction/unlock
The vault artifact is safe to store publicly (Dropbox, printed QR, friend's email)

What the vault unlocks

Printable encrypted document bundle (ID scan, insurance cards, emergency contacts)
BIP39 seed phrase -> crypto wallet recovery
Passphrase to a DSAR (data subject access request) identity kit
Emergency contact list

Privacy architecture

All processing client-side (WebAssembly or mobile native)
Raw biometric never transmitted or stored anywhere
Vault artifact reveals nothing about the biometric

License

MIT pipeline / BSL 1.1 AI features

Status

Backlog

## Godwit Emergency identity recovery for when you have nothing -- no ID, no phone, no password, no money. Uses camera-based fingerprint capture and fuzzy vault cryptography to unlock a pre-prepared recovery kit from any device with a camera. ### Problem If you are robbed, your car is towed, or any other emergency strips you of wallet and phone simultaneously, your only remaining authentication factor is your body. Passwords require memory. Devices require possession. Biometrics are always with you. ### Technical approach - Multi-shot camera capture (library computer webcam, borrowed smartphone) - Illumination normalization + ridge enhancement + minutiae extraction - Fuzzy vault / fuzzy commitment scheme -- biometric derives the key, biometric is never stored - Raw biometric template discarded immediately after vault construction/unlock - The vault artifact is safe to store publicly (Dropbox, printed QR, friend's email) ### What the vault unlocks - Printable encrypted document bundle (ID scan, insurance cards, emergency contacts) - BIP39 seed phrase -> crypto wallet recovery - Passphrase to a DSAR (data subject access request) identity kit - Emergency contact list ### Privacy architecture - All processing client-side (WebAssembly or mobile native) - Raw biometric never transmitted or stored anywhere - Vault artifact reveals nothing about the biometric ### License MIT pipeline / BSL 1.1 AI features ### Status Backlog